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Abstract
This study examined the efficacy of community-level fishery co-management organizations called Beach Management
Units (BMUs) along the Kenyan shores of Lake Victoria. BMUs were established to enhance sustainable Lake Victoria
fishery management through increasing the level of community participation to assist in the administration of fisheries
rules and regulations by, and for, the fishers. Inefficiencies have emerged, however, inhibiting the effective execution of
sustainable fisheries management by the BMUs. Data were collected from 36 BMUs along the Kenyan shores of Lake
Victoria. Descriptive and inferential analyses were performed using SPSS Version 20.0. The results indicated that BMUs
are successful at educating fishers and that they are aware of fishing rules and regulations. Nevertheless, high violation
rates were also observed, suggesting BMUs have limited impact on fisher decisions to comply with regulations. Data sug-
gest that the failure to comply may be due to lack of adequate financial and equipment resources for monitoring, control
and surveillance (MCS) operations, making them unable to control illegal fishing in their areas of jurisdiction. Further-
more, financial mechanisms, which would allow BMUs to sustainably fund their administrative and MCS operations, are
weak, thereby reducing the BMUs ability to effectively function. The data from this study highlight two activities illustrat-
ing significant indices of good performance, namely resolving disputes and receiving visitors. The data also suggest the
creation of BMUs has not ensured successful implementation of co-management of Lake Victoria fisheries. BMUs are
successful at activities of a social nature, but have poorly undertaken their core functions related to enforcement and
compliance with fishing rules.
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INTRODUCTION
Lake Victoria is the world’s second largest freshwater
lake and the largest tropical lake, with a total surface
area of 68 800 km2 (Witte & van Densen 1995). The
lake’s surface areas are shared by three countries; Tanza-
nia (51%), Uganda (43%) and Kenya (6%). Lake Victoria is
a multi-use resource, valued for its immense socio-eco-
nomic and ecological benefits, including its critical role
as a source of food and potable water, transportation, irri-
gation water, power production and tourism (LVFO
2008a). The lake has been transformed into the largest
freshwater fishery in the world over the last 30 years,
producing annual catches of over 1 000 000 tonnes that
are worth about US $590 million (Kolding et al. 2014;
LVFO 2014). The lake’s fisheries support approximately
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two million people with household incomes and meet the
annual fish consumption needs of almost 22 million peo-
ple in the region (LVFO 2014).
The current fishery is dominated by two introduced
species, including Nile perch (Lates niloticus L.) and Nile
tilapia (Oreochromis niloticus L.), and one native cyprinid
(Rastrineobola argentea) (Pellegrin, 1904) (Balirwa et al.
2003; Njiru et al. 2008). Nile perch is by far the highest
valued species in the lake’s fishery, supporting a multi-
million dollar export industry that provides the three East
African countries with about US $350 million in export
earnings per year (Marshall & Mkumbo 2012; Njiru et al.
2014). Nile perch is not the only valuable fish species in
Lake Victoria. Rastrineobola argentea is now the most
important catch from the lake in terms of weight, con-
tributing almost 61.5% of the total fish landings (10 339
tonnes) in Kenyan waters, with ex-vessel value of total
fishers’ earnings of approximately US $2.5 million
(Ojwang et al. 2014). The catch of Nile tilapia is now esti-
mated to be around 70 000 t per annum, valued at US
$38 million (Abila et al. 2008; LVFO 2008a).
The lake has experienced some of the most extreme
ecological perturbations and negative impacts over the
past century from a variety of interlinked anthropogenic
activities, including population growth, intense fishing,
increased land cultivation, introduction of exotic species,
industrial pollution, eutrophication and, more recently, cli-
mate change (Hecky et al. 2010; Muyodi et al. 2010).
Indeed, the overfishing and continuing unchecked
eutrophication could lead to a catastrophic loss of produc-
tivity in this now immense fishery (Kolding et al. 2008;
Hecky et al. 2010). According to Ogello et al. (2013), the
uncontrolled access to the lake is largely to blame for
both the ecological and environmental issues impacting
the Lake Victoria fishery. Although enormous resources
have been used for management and conservation of the
lake and its vast resources, very little success has been
realized to date.
Prior to the late 1990s, Lake Victoria fisheries manage-
ment was conducted through centralized state-controlled
fisheries authorities (Kundu et al. 2010), with little or no
provision for involving fisheries stakeholders in the fish-
ery decision-making process (Lwenya & Abila 2003;
Ogwang et al. 2009). This management system, however,
failed to sustain the fisheries for those dependent on the
resource for their livelihood (Geheb & Crean 2003; Lawr-
ence & Watkins 2011). The continuous deterioration of
ecological integrity of the lake, and declining fish
catches, necessitated a ‘paradigm shift’ from a top-down
management approach to a collaborative or ‘co-manage-
ment’ approach involving stakeholders at all levels (Njiru
et al. 2008). Co-management involves sharing roles and
responsibilities for resource management between the
government, resource users, civil society institutions and
private sector stakeholders. For Lake Victoria, the fishing
communities participate in co-management through orga-
nizations called Beach Management Units (BMUs).
According to the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization
(LVFO), which is the fishery co-management coordinat-
ing body for Lake Victoria, a BMU is defined as ‘an orga-
nization of fisher folk at the beach (boat crew, boat
owners, managers, charterers, fish processors, fishmon-
gers, local gear makers or repairers and fishing equip-
ment dealers) within a fishing community’ (LVFO 2007).
A key piece of legislation (The Fisheries (Beach Manage-
ment Unit) Regulations, 2007, under the Fisheries Act
(Cap 378) – Legal Notice No. 42), – was passed in Kenya
in 2007, giving BMUs the rights to manage resources at
a particular landing site (GoK 2007), with guidelines
being prepared for the constitution and operation of
BMUs (Ogwang et al. 2006).
Formation of BMU structures in Kenya started in
2004, and by 2006, most of the BMUs had been estab-
lished. Establishing the BMUs built on beach committee
arrangements in existence since the early 1960s (Abila
et al. 2009). BMUs can comprise one or more landing
sites. To qualify for registration as a BMU, however, a
landing site needs to have a minimum of 30 boats among
other requirements (Ogwang et al. 2006; Cinner et al.
2009). The spatial jurisdiction of a BMU constitutes a
defined geographical area that has been surveyed, its
boundaries clearly delineated, and marked as a fish land-
ing station by the Director of Fisheries. The BMU func-
tions within their area of jurisdiction include recording
fish landings and enforcing fisheries regulations (Cinner
et al. 2009). BMUs are required to make their own rules,
in the form of by-laws to govern their internal operations,
examples being restricting certain gears or establishing a
fisheries closure, although final approval rests with the
Director of Fisheries.
Although adoption of the lake fisheries co-manage-
ment program was viewed as a good option for regulating
the exploitation of the fishery (van der Knaap et al.
2002), catch and effort continue to expand on Lake Victo-
ria (Kolding et al. 2008), leading to concerns about the
ability of the co-management program to manage this
valuable fishery in a sustainable manner. Despite the
many functions of BMUs (LVFO 2005), their main func-
tion was to enhance the level of compliance of fisheries
rules and regulations, thereby fostering responsible fish-
ing practices for the lake (LVFO 2007). Cinner et al.
(2009) provides a comprehensive review of the roles of
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BMUs as stipulated in the Beach Management
Regulations, including boundaries/membership of BMUs,
rule-making, enforcement and monitoring, and partner-
ship roles of nested institutions. Inefficiencies have
emerged, however, that negatively affect BMU abilities to
perform their designated roles of sustainable fisheries
management (Abila et al. 2006; Ogwang et al. 2009).
A major concern is that BMUs have not influenced fish-
ers’ attitudes about unsustainable fishing tendencies
(Nunan 2007; LVFO 2008b; Eggert & Lokina 2008).
Although BMUs were initiated about a decade ago, there
is still insufficient information on their performance levels,
the challenges they face, and their role in fostering respon-
sible fisheries and community development. These knowl-
edge gaps may lead to unjustified conclusions concerning
the impacts of co-management for Lake Victoria. Accord-
ingly, this study investigated the challenges facing fish-
eries co-management structures and processes on Lake
Victoria, and how they impact the Nile perch fisheries.
Theoretical framework
Lake Victoria is categorized as a common pool resource
(CPR) (Ogello et al. 2013). Broadly defined, CPRs are
resources to which more than one individual has access,
but where each person’s consumption reduces the avail-
ability of the resource to others (Dietz et al. 2003). In
this regard, fishers are free to exploit fisheries resources,
subject to regulations such as gear restrictions, fishing
area closure and seasonal restrictions (Eggert &
Ellergard 2003). However, it is important to note that
whereas fishers have ‘user’ rights, they do not have abso-
lute ‘ownership’ rights. This is one key limitation in
management, as any one or a group of fishers cannot
exclude others from enjoying the same resource.
Over the past two decades, scholarship on resource use
and management has emphasized the key role of institu-
tions, communities and socio-economic factors (Agrawal &
Chhatre 2006). Successful fisheries co-management
requires an appropriate institutional and organizational
framework for CPR governance (Baland & Platteau 1996).
Institutions constitute the central element in co-manage-
ment analysis. In this research framework, an institution is
defined as: ‘the rules of the game in a society; or the humanly
devised constraints that shape human interactions, and are
affected by social, cultural, economic and political factors’
(North 1990). An Institutional Analysis Framework (IAF)
was used to identify and examine key factors affecting the
BMU institution and outcomes of co-management in the
Lake Victoria fishery (Fig. 1). This empirical research
framework allowed for data to be collected and analysed in
a standardized format, and generalizations made about fish-
eries co-management arrangements for use within the
country and beyond (Pomeroy et al. 2001). IAF helps us
better understand that institutions are affected by multidi-
mensional and complex relationships of causal influences
arising from biophysical, economic, demographic, institu-
tional, infrastructural and socio-political contexts that sur-
round, or are a part of, such institutions (ICLARM & IFM
1998; Agrawal 2001). Existing studies have recognized each
of these causal classes as being instrumental in influencing
resource governance outcomes (Alvarez & Naughton-
Treves 2003; Agrawal & Chhatre 2006; Ostrom et al. 2009).
Biophysical
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Causal influences
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Fishing/activity
Fishing technology
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Peer pressure
Conflict among BMU
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outcomeFig. 1. Institutional Analysis Frame-
work (IAF; modified from ICLARM &
IFM 1998).
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Biophysical characteristics of a resource often influ-
ence harvest behaviour (ICLARM & IFM 1998). As an
example, perceived low fish populations in Lake Victoria
can lead to further overexploitation of the fishery by
those using smaller nets to catch fewer fish. The harvest-
ing activity of an individual fisher subtracts from the
quantity of fish available for other fishers to catch (Oak-
erson 1992). Indeed, a number of scholars have explicitly
identified high levels of variation in biophysical factors,
and therefore resource flows, as the source of pressures
for self-organization and local cooperation (Ostrom 1990;
Wade 1994; Baland & Platteau 1996; Agrawal 2001) Insti-
tutional arrangements, however, have an indirect effect
on outcomes as they lead to changes in human behaviour
and choice, which can affect interactions and outcomes
(Oakerson 1992). Institutional variables include those
related to representation and inclusion of users; monitor-
ing, control and surveillance; enforcement of rules; and
relationship with external authorities. Agrawal and Gib-
son (1999) argue that institutional arrangements, struc-
tured by the contextual variables, affect the actions of the
resource users by shaping the incentives and disincen-
tives they face to coordinate and cooperate in resource
governance, management and use.
Economic variables include market attributes that
influence the incentives for resource use activities, effort
levels and motivations for compliance with fishing rules
(ICLARM & IFM 1998). Some of these market variables
include stability of supply and demand in terms of price
and quantity, market availability and location, market
structure, credit/market relationships, and changes in
market and market operation. Demographic factors are
represented by the number of fishers per unit area, num-
ber of boats and gears operational in the lake, or similar
variables. Socio-political variables facilitate collective
action through cultural and economic homogeneity in
terms of kinship, ethnicity, religion, interests, beliefs, cus-
toms, and livelihood strategies (Onyango & Jentoft 2008).
As an example, if the fishers are highly dependent upon
the fishery, and if the availability of the resource is uncer-
tain or limited, fishers are more likely to facilitate collec-
tive action to deal with the problem (ICLARM & IFM
1998).
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
Study area, research design and sample
size
This study was conducted between July and October
2009 at formal Beach Management Units located at fish
landing beaches on the Kenyan shoreline of Lake Victoria
(Fig. 2). A two-stage stratified random sampling approach
was used to select the BMUs surveyed and the study par-
ticipants. As a first step, as Nile perch was the motivation
for establishment of the Lake Victoria co-management
program, the criterion for BMU inclusion in this study
meant identifying landing beaches with Nile perch fishing
as the main fish species. Thus, a total of 36 BMUs were
selected on the basis of this criterion, using data from
Kenya’s 2008 Frame Survey (LVFO 2008c). Second,
participants were selected on the basis of their role at the
BMU. Two BMU committee leaders and two boat owners
were selected at each BMU, to gain an understanding of
fishery management-related activities and the variables
Fig. 2. Map of Lake Victoria, show-
ing locations of landing beaches and
Beach Management Units visited in
Kenya.
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that might affect these activities. BMU committee leaders
were chosen because they are responsible for day-to-day
operations of the BMU. Boat owners were chosen
because they are the main decision makers when it
comes to fishing-related decisions. Boat owners are those
that invest in fishing enterprises, check on catches, over-
see the sale of fish and payment of crew, and consider
input needs such as the costs of nets and boat repairs.
Boat owners are generally wealthier, more powerful and
have influence on decisions over the boat crews (Nunan
2007). Thus, four respondents were selected at each
BMU, comprising a total of 141 respondents. It is noted
that only one BMU committee leader was interviewed for
one study site, due to conflict in the BMU leadership,
owing to corruption and mismanagement.
Data collection and analysis
To determine the appropriateness of the structured ques-
tionnaires used in this study, a pilot study was used to
adjust the questionnaires before conducting the actual
survey. The questionnaires were pretested at three
BMUs, using 12 respondents (six boat owners and six
BMU leaders). Primary data were collected at landing
beaches, using structured questionnaires. The survey
comprised of two different categories of interviews:
(i) a questionnaire targeting boat owners; and (ii) a BMU
executive committee leaders questionnaire targeting
BMU committee leaders, specifically the chairman and
secretary. Other members of the committee were used in
cases when the chairman or secretary was absent. Sec-
ondary data from reviewing government documents and
other archival materials, and published studies and con-
sultant reports on the Nile perch fisheries, provided addi-
tional details. Data provided by recent lakewide Frame
Surveys conducted since 2000 (LVFO 2010; LVFO 2012)
were used to assess the level of effort in fish production
sector, as well as to generate socio-economic and ecologi-
cal information. Primary data were entered and analysed,
using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (IBM-SPSS
Inc. version 20.0 IBM Corp. Released 2011. IBM SPSS
Statistics for Windows, Version 20.0. Armonk, NY: USA).
Both descriptive and inferential analyses, such as per-
centage distribution techniques, cross-tabulations and chi-
square (v2) goodness of fit, were used to analyse the
data.
RESULTS
Perceptions on the biophysical factors of
the Nile perch fishery
Among the interviewed boat owners, 93% stated there
was a serious decline in Nile perch catches, 4% reported
that catches remain unchanged, and 3% felt that catches
have increased compared to the past 5 years. Similarly,
98% of BMU committee leaders reported that Nile perch
catches had declined considerably. A significant majority
(v2 = 62.9739; d.f. = 2; P = 0.001) of boat owners
acknowledged the lake fishery is threatened with com-
plete collapse, due to a drastic decline in the Nile perch
stocks. According to 49% of the respondents, the major
cause of the Nile perch decline is the use of illegal and
destructive fishing practices, including fishing in breed-
ing grounds, using illegal beach seines, and small mesh-
sized ‘monofilament’ nets; and overfishing, the latter
being expressed as ‘too many fishers’ in the lake
(Table 1). Other cited reasons included a massive
increase in fishing effort occasioned by too many boats
and gears (26%), pollution and eutrophication brought by
agricultural nutrients, water hyacinth re-emergence and
industrial effluence; and blockage of the Mbita Causeway
(19%), among other factors (19%). In addition, BMU lead-
ers and boat owners reported they have experienced
changes in average catches of Nile perch captured per
boat. Fifty seven per cent of boat owners indicated their
average daily catch was below 10 kg boat1, compared to
2 years ago, while 24% stated their daily catch ranged
Table 1. Fisher’s perceptions on changes in Nile perch catches and causes for the changes
Perceived change in Nile perch catch
Perceived causes of changes in Nile perch stocks (%)
Overfishing
Pollution and
eutrophication
Increasing fishing effort
(boats and gears) Illegal fishing Others
Become worse (catch is declining) 49* 19 26 49* 19
Improved from the past 1 0 0 3 1
Remained the same (No change) 0 0 1 0 0
Proportions: Each fisher was given an opportunity to identify up to three causes. (Significant difference*) (v2 = 15.4604; d.f. = 2;
P = 0.0004)
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between 11 and 30 kg boat1. Nearly 12% reported they
capture over 30 kg boat1 daily, compared to only 7%
who caught more than 60 kg boat1 daily.
Demographic factors causing changes in
Lake Victoria fishery
A majority of respondents in this study reported their
belief that there is an increased number of fishermen
on the lake, with 62% of boat owners, and 63% of BMU
leaders stating there are more fishers, compared to
2 years ago. Furthermore, respondents were asked
whether they were worried that the increasing number
of fishermen would result in a decline in their individ-
ual catches. Those who were worried about having
enough fish in the future, compared to those who do
not worry about this issue, were almost evenly dis-
tributed; a further 51% of boat owners do not worry
and 49% do worry. Of the 70 boat owners interviewed,
38% were not worried, and will not buy any additional
gear, 18% are worried, but will not buy more gear, and
11% are not worried but will buy more gear. Sixty-four
percent (n = 49) of boat owners had increased the
number of gear, while only 16% had increased the
number of boats owned. The major reason for not
investing in the purchase of more boats was identified
as declining fish catches (84%), resulting in a reduced
rate of capital investment into the fishery. Despite the
increase in the number of gear, 60% of the respondents
reported they had caught less fish. These findings are
consistent with actual results for the whole lake for all
the biennial Frame Surveys conducted from 2000 to
2012 (LVFO 2013). Lakewide fishing efforts increased
between 2010 and 2012, measured in terms of fishing
crafts and fishing gear, apart from traps and baskets,
(fishing crafts 7.7%; gillnets 19.1%; small seines 11.6%;
scoop nets 61.2%; longline hooks 15.6%; beach seines
16.9%; cast nets 21.9%; and monofilament gillnets 113.8%
(Table 2)).
Economic factors regarding the fishery
About 82% of boat owners target Nile perch because of
its high net income, driven by rising prices in export
markets. Other stated reasons include a lack of skill for
catching other fish other species (6%), with another 6%
alluding to the difficult working conditions in fishing for
R. argentea, which is traditionally done at night
(Table 3). Regarding the presence of illegal-sized Nile
perch at landing beaches, 64% of boat owners disclosed
that they ‘freely’ sold undersize fish to local traders
within their beach, while 40% of BMU officials admitted
they allowed sales of illegal-sized fish and/or sanctioned
rampant undersize fish trade practices. In most beaches
visited, sun-drying and deep-frying of juvenile fish were
observed before the fish were transported to local
(<5 km) and distant markets in the Democratic Republic
of Congo.
Over 70% of respondents stated they are involved in
other income-generating activities, due to declining eco-
Table 2. Indicators of fishing effort in the Lake Victoria fishery
Indicator 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
% change
2010–2012
Landing sites 1492 1452 1433 1431 1327 1443 1481 2.6
No. of fishers 129 305 175 890 153 066 196 426 199 242 194 172 205 249 5.7
No. of boats 42 519 52 476 51 592 68 836 67 513 64 595 69 549 7.7
Outboard motors 4108 6552 9609 12 765 13 721 16 188 20 217 24.9
Sails 6304 9620 8672 10 310 9811 8424 7871 6.6
Paddles 32 032 35 720 33 405 45 753 43 553 39 771 41 392 4.1
Gillnets <5”* 113 117 178 205 142 618 215 049 207 954 159 013 200 689 26.2
Gillnets >5” 537 475 724 879 1 090 434 1 007 258 805 678 708 292 832 295 17.5
Hand lines 53 205 58 123 40 953 71 636 65 717 48 681 49 679 2.1
Longlines hooks 3 496 247 8 098 023 6 096 338 9 044 550 11 267 606 11 472 068 13 257 248 15.6
Dagaa: small seines 3588 7796 8601 9632 10 276 13 514 15 064 11.5
Beach seines* 7613 3491 3355 3653 4187 3743 4375 16.9
Cast nets* 5887 1095 803 775 1174 1282 1551 21.0
Monofilament nets* 0 0 5944 2293 20 194 16 488 35 253 113.8
* and italics denote illegal type of gear (Source: Frame survey LVFO, 2010; LVFO 2012). Bold letters show percentage change in fishing
effort for different indicators between 2010 and 2012 Frame Surveys.
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nomic returns from the fishery. Forty-two percent of
BMU committee leaders stated they are engaged in farm-
ing; 30% are engaged in postharvest fisheries-related
activities such as fish processing and trading, boat build-
ing, net repairing, and boat transport; 14% are engaged
horticultural crop farming; 6% in livestock rearing; and 8%
in other livelihood-generating activities such as sand min-
ing, agroforestry, fish farming, cafes, bars and beachside
hotels. Thirty-six percent (n = 18) of boat owners stated
they were involved in farming; 28% in postharvest fish-
eries-related activities; 20% in horticulture; 5% in livestock
rearing; and 11% in other activities such as bicycle and
motorcycle taxis and boat transport, casual labourers,
poultry rearing, and small-scale business.
Socio-cultural and political factors affecting
BMU operations
The fishing community of Lake Victoria comprises people
of diverse ethnic, gender and socio-cultural backgrounds,
all of whom derive their livelihoods from fishing or fish
trading. The major ethnic groups encountered during the
survey were from the Luo tribe (93%), followed by the
Luhya (4%) and Suba (2%) tribes. Other tribal groups
included immigrant fishers of Somali origin, Kikuyus,
Kisii and Kalenjins who were attracted to the lake for
commercial gain. The fishery also supports formal and
informal groups at the community level. Sixty percent
(n = 42) of BMU committee leaders stated they are
members of formal and informal groups such as fishery
co-operatives, self-help groups, trader groups and welfare
and credit associations.
This study sought to identify the presence and level of
conflict within, and between, neighbouring BMUs. Survey
findings indicated that 59% of BMU leaders and 39% of
boat owners acknowledged they had experienced various
kinds of conflicts within their BMUs, mainly attributed to
theft or destruction of fishing gear; competition for fish-
ing resources or landing space; differences between ‘tra-
ditional’ fishing boundaries and newly demarcated
boundaries and areas; access to fish landings due to
water hyacinth; and, use of ‘destructive’ fishing tech-
niques in breeding areas. Furthermore, 51% of BMU lead-
ers and 31% of boat owners acknowledged they
experienced both internal and external conflicts between
their BMUs and neighbouring BMUs. Most respondents
(over 50%) indicated the level of conflict is limited, while
38% of boat owners and 28% of BMU committee leaders
stated that significant tensions can erupt into violence,
and 22% of BMU committee leaders and only a few of the
boat owners (8%) responded there have been violent dis-
putes. Of all the study respondents, 89% indicated their
BMU was successful in resolving disputes.
Institutional factors affecting BMU
performance
Beach Management Units are at the frontline of enforc-
ing fishing rules and regulations, as conducted through
regular monitoring and patrol exercises. Eighty-seven
percent of BMU committee leaders and 77% of boat own-
ers reported that BMUs conduct regular patrol and moni-
toring exercises. Collectively, over 50% of the
respondents stated that patrols are done frequently.
When asked whether other authorized entities conduct
patrols, 60% of BMU leaders and 54% of boat owners
reported government agencies conduct patrols indepen-
dent of BMUs. Many respondents also indicated, how-
ever, that BMUs do not have provisions for regular
surveillance or patrols to ensure compliance. Based on
results from BMU committee leaders, the BMUs are lim-
ited in their capacity to conduct patrol operations, includ-
ing lack of equipment (51%) such as boats and engines,
high fuel costs (22%), lack of funds to pay patrol teams
(12%), lack of security during patrols (10%), and other fac-
tors such as bribing of fisheries officials, and high cost of
hiring security officials (5%). About 51% of BMUs use
boats with motorized engines to conduct patrols, 33% use
hand paddle-propelled boats, 12% use wind-propelled
boats, and 4% apply land-based observations to monitor
fishing irregularities.
Regarding fishers knowledge of fishing rules and reg-
ulations, almost all the BMU committee leaders and boat
owners admitted they are aware of current national laws
and BMU regulations regarding Nile perch fishing. In
particular, a majority of BMU committee leaders (90%)
and boat owners (91%) were aware of the minimum mesh
size (5”), while 88% and 89% of respondents, respectively,
correctly identified the minimum legal size (50 cm total
Table 3. Main reasons for fishing Nile perch species in Lake Vic-
toria during study period
Main reasons for
fishing Nile perch
% Frequency of
respondents (n = 70)
High income returns
due to rising export prices
82
Lack skills for fishing
other species
6
No other alternatives 6
Others factors such as low
market value of other fish
species and poor working conditions
6
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length) of fish to be landed (Fig. 3). Furthermore, 57% of
the BMU committee leaders and 50% of boat owners sta-
ted they were aware of regulations that prevent fish land-
ings from other BMUs without a ‘letter of introduction’.
In terms of enforcing fishing regulations, 88% of BMU
committee leaders and 85% of boat owners acknowledged
that BMU committees take legal action by arresting or
fining offenders, confiscating illegal gears when someone
is caught using them, or stopping use of destructive fish-
ing methods. Furthermore, over 50% of BMU committee
leaders regarded the punishment of offenders to be ‘fair,’
while 45% of boat owners thought the punishment was
‘too severe,’ especially cancellation of licences, permits or
certificate of registration; confiscation of gears by police,
and burning of illegal nets, among others. About 26% of
boat owners stated the rules are ‘too lenient’, meaning
they would not report habitual offenders if they encoun-
tered them breaking the law.
This study analysed key indicators of BMU institu-
tional performance, based on indices produced by Abila
et al. (2006), as shown in Figure 4. Overall, only two
activities exhibited significant indices of good perfor-
mance according to BMU committee leaders, namely
resolving disputes (91%) and receiving visitors (99%).
Activities that the BMUs performed averagely were the
provision of services by the BMUs (75%), arresting of
offenders (64%) and enforcement of fishing rules (61%).
The activity with the worst performances, according to
the BMU leaders, was confiscation of illegal gears (53%).
These results indicate that BMUs are involved in activi-
ties with a high potential for social sustainability. How-
ever, they have poorly undertaken their core functions
related to enforcement and compliance with fishing rules.
These results agree with findings of Abila et al. (2006)
who found the activities most frequently carried out by
BMUs are resolving disputes, receiving visitors, and
arresting offenders. Abila et al. (2006) reported that no
BMU activity received an overall good performance index
mainly because they lacked legal power for prosecuting
offenders and confiscating illegal gears.
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Considering the financial sustainability and viability of
BMUs, most BMU leaders (96%) stated the main source
of income for BMUs are taxes charged on beach area
access, fish sales, boat and gear licensing, while 43% sta-
ted they obtain their incomes from fines imposed on ille-
gal fishing tendencies. Very few BMUs (4%) obtain any
significant income from other sources. Forty-six percent
(n = 33) of BMU committee leaders reported collecting
income in the range of Kshs 4000–20 000 per month, 36%
collect less than Kshs 4000 per month, while 6% do not
get any income. BMU committee leaders reported that
13% of BMUs earn more than Kshs 20 000.
Furthermore, the roles of partnership or nested insti-
tutions such as the Fisheries Department (FD), Kenya
Marine and Fisheries Research Institute (KMFRI) and
Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization (LVFO) also were
investigated in regard to BMU empowerment. These
institutions are regarded as the main actors operating at
different stages and scales in the fisheries sector, includ-
ing their involvement in development and functions; visit-
ing BMUs to monitor performance; and in representation
of fishers interest in fisheries management plans. Almost
all respondents (99%) were aware of FD activities, as it is
vested with the overall responsibility for monitoring and
supervising BMU activities, and also is involved in all
stages of BMU development process. Similarly, a large
percentage of BMU officials (86%) are well-informed
about the activities of KMFRI through repeated support,
mentorship and guidance of their BMU activities.
Although a majority of the respondents (99%) know what
the LVFO is, their functions are not well recognized as
only a few BMU committee leaders reported they have
met the staff of the organization.
DISCUSSION
Biophysical factors of the fishery
A declining trend in the catches of Nile perch has been
recorded for Lake Victoria over the last two decades. In
the present study, fishers reported that fish catches have
declined rapidly in recent years, and have remained low
despite the development of co-management initiatives.
Similarly, almost all the fishers reported a decrease in
individual fish catches over the last 5 years since the cre-
ation of BMUs. Likewise, other biological indicators such
as fish size at maturity, growth, longevity and maximum
size of fish populations also are under stress, suggesting
heavy overexploitation (Ogari & Asila 1992; Matsuishi
et al. 2006). Peak production was realized in Kenya in
1991, when Nile perch contributed 57% of the total land-
ings (Othina & Tweddle 1999). Kenya invested more
heavily in the Nile perch fishery, being the first to ven-
ture into fish processing factories in East Africa
(SEDAWOG 2000), therefore also first experiencing the
decline in Nile perch catches (Othina & Tweddle 1999).
Annual catches in Kenya declined from a peak of 122 780
t in 1991, to about half (61 416 t) in 1998 (Othina &
Tweddle 1999). The contribution of Nile perch towards
fish catches in all three Lake Victoria’s riparian countries
rose to 58% in 1996, but dropped to 39.2% in total fish pro-
duction in 2007 (LVFO, 2008). The catch per unit effort
decreased from 180 kg boat day1 in 1989, to 80 kg boat
day1 in 1999 (Othina & Tweddle 1999), leading to sev-
ere food and income insecurity, a situation currently per-
sisting in the Lake Victoria region. While fishers
generally catch fewer fish for daily household consump-
tion, there is little certainty for the future, as fishers may
catch no fish on some days (Geheb et al. 2007).
Although the future of the Lake Victoria fishery is dif-
ficult to predict, if current fishing levels continue, future
fish stocks may consist of smaller fish with lower com-
mercial value. According to Kolding et al. (2008),
changes in the size and distribution of the Nile perch in
Lake Victoria may reflect the interaction of both fishing
pressure and eutrophication. Kolding et al. (2008) argue
that eutrophication is primarily responsible for the cur-
rent observed downward trends in Nile perch stocks.
Thus, management should be more concerned with con-
trolling eutrophication than focusing on illegal fishing
practices which have no significant effect on fish stocks.
Although eutrophication has been shown to have signifi-
cant effects on fish stocks (Hecky 2003), the negative
influences of fishing pressure and illegal fishing on the
Nile perch populations have demonstrated that fishery
management must specifically address each of these fac-
tors (Matsuishi et al. 2006; Mkumbo et al. 2007; Gouds-
waard et al. 2008). Acknowledging that multiple factors
often influence aquatic ecosystems, and in the light of
research that demonstrates both eutrophication and fish-
ing pressure can have detrimental effects on the Lake
Victoria Nile perch fishery, efforts should be made to
address both eutrophication and overfishing as causative
factors for the declining fishery.
Demographic factors affecting the fishery
The Lake Victoria fishery has been influenced by an
increased number of fishers, boats and gear operational
in the lake. These features have been, and still remain,
the dominant features in managing the fish stocks
(Matsuishi et al. 2006; Ogello et al. 2013). Most fishers
join the fisheries either using their own boats, or by rent-
ing boats from other fishers. Study results indicate a
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large percentage of boats owned by fishermen are target-
ing Nile perch. The fishers targeting Nile perch use three
main fishing gears, namely hooks and longline, gillnets
operated either passively or as drift gillnets, and beach
seines. The increase in gears such as beach seines and
small hooks targeting young fish, or the more efficient
gear such as monofilament nets, and the inexpensive, but
efficient, gear such as hand line hooks and cast nets, all
being illegal, is probably a response of fishers to declin-
ing catches and limited financial returns in the fisheries.
This situation clearly may lead to further depletion of the
fisheries if not controlled (LVFO 2008c). Gill nets of
<127 mm (<5”) are readily available in beach side shops
and in some fishing villages that were visited during the
present study.
The number of nets a fisherman can use has
increased over the past few years because of two main
factors. The first is that depth consideration has changed
the concept of a ‘single net’ to ‘double netting.’ In the
deeper or open waters, the mounting of small seines can
go up to 8 pieces, that is, a maximum depth of 27 m. The
second is that, in shallow waters such as in the gulf, the
nets remain single, but are extended horizontally to cover
wider areas. In certain areas such as around Kendu Bay,
however, it can be mounted twice; that is, hanging at
nine metres depth (Abila et al. 2009). It is important to
note that shallow areas act as important feeding areas
and breeding grounds for many species, especially Nile
tilapia. Overfishing in these areas, therefore, threatens
the ecological integrity of the lake ecosystem. Indeed,
the Nyanza Gulf is the most intensively fished part of the
lake, experiencing more than 10 fishers per km2, com-
pared to about 2 per km2 for the rest of the lake (LVFO
2008c). This suggests an unsustainable tendency for the
Nile perch fishery, as fish are being caught before they
can contribute to the regeneration of the stocks. Overall,
Lake Victoria fisheries, similar to other regulated access
fisheries, exhibit significant signs of overexploitation,
overcapitalization and low profitability (Bokea & Ikiara
2000). The declining fish stocks threaten the survival of
nearly half a million communities in Kenya dependent on
the fisheries.
Economic factors of the fishery
The Nile perch fishery has been the hub of development
for the Lake Victoria fishery in Kenya, contributing signif-
icantly to the national economy (Yongo et al. 2009). Most
fishermen target Nile perch, and make the largest
incomes of approximately Kshs. 170 kg1, compared to
Kshs 150 kg1 earned by tilapia fishermen. The exploita-
tion of Nile perch in Lake Victoria is strongly export-ori-
ented, achieved through the international trade of fish
and fish products by the processing factories
(Schuurhuizen et al. 2006; Johnson 2010). Fishermen sell
their catch to a variety of buyers, including agents of fish
companies, traders and other intermediaries or brokers
(Yongo et al. 2009). As a result, there has been intense
competition for Nile perch and its by-products between
the local, regional, export and fishmeal markets (Johnson
2010). The global demand for Nile perch has reshaped
the pressure on fish stocks in ways that overwhelm the
ability of locally evolved BMUs to regulate their use.
Fishers are organized around BMU networks that are not
strong enough to negotiate on prices, for example, leav-
ing them at the mercy of fish agents and processors.
This is in contrast to fish processors that regularly meet
to champion better marketing and trade terms for partici-
pants in the industry.
An emerging challenge affecting BMU performance
has been an increase in export markets that prefer smal-
ler fillets from immature fish of 0.5–1 kg live body weight
(LVFO 2001; Geheb et al. 2007). This could increase the
incentive for fishers to utilize smaller nets to capture
undersized fish at the expense of larger ones capable of
spawning to supply those markets. The neighbouring
regional and local markets also encourage the exploita-
tion of undersized Nile perch, which continue to be
caught with both legal and illegal gear (Geheb et al.
2007; LVFO 2013). It is possible that the regional market
for small fish, rather than the formal export market, is
now driving illegalities in the Nile perch fishery, thereby
endangering the stock (LVFO 2008a). Such regional mar-
kets and their suppliers are directly contributing towards
the destruction, through overfishing, of the same fishery
that is benefitting them, thereby negating the gains made
by community participation in resource management.
Socio-cultural factors hinder the fishery
The fishing community of Lake Victoria comprises people
of diverse ethnic, gender and socio-cultural backgrounds
sharing the common interest of deriving their livelihood
from fishing or fish trading. The fishery in Kenya is dom-
inated by the Luo, Luhya and Abasuba ethnic groups
(LVFO 2006). Despite the different origins of these
groups, all display similar social structures and long his-
torical relationships with the fishery. During the early
stages of BMU formation, Abila et al. (2000) suggested
that traditions and cultural practices of these indigenous
people may have been used effectively to co-manage the
fisheries. The proliferation of immigrant fishermen from
other ethnic groups, such as Somalis, Kikuyus, Kisiis and
Kalenjins, presents new challenges in the management of
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Lake Victoria that may compromise sustainable fisheries
management. Geheb and Crean (2003) argue that the
new groups of people have different socio-economic con-
siderations and background. Thus, relations between
newcomers and established community members are
often weak or impaired. Moreover, immigrant fishers
likely have less ‘ownership’ and knowledge of the fishery,
therefore also having less incentive and will to limit their
fishing effort to protect future stocks (Geheb & Crean
2003). In fact, it is in their interest to maximize catches
in the short term through intensive fishing (Viner et al.
2006).
Most fishermen acknowledged that a number of for-
mal and informal organizations exist at the fishing com-
munity level. In Kenya, the lake supports over 50 000
fishers, 300 000 artisanal fish processors and traders,
seven fish processing plants and many primary coopera-
tive type fisheries organizations. The latter include more
than 300 BMUs, 30 small fishermen cooperative soci-
eties, and over 350 women fish traders associations
(Abila 2009; LVFO 2012). These fisher organizations are
important for enhancing collective responsibility in
managing the fisheries resources as they may be used
to mobilize fishers and resources for fisheries manage-
ment (Abila 2002). However, formal and informal groups
formed within the BMU are always responsible for
ensuring adherence to the fishing rules (Owino 2002). In
the present study, the perceived compliance by one’s
peers is an important determinant in the decision to
comply with, or alternatively to violate, the regulations.
If the local BMU members go to the same church, shop
in the same markets, and their children go in the same
schools, a fisher may feel less inclined to use illegal gear
if he knows that it will hurt his friends (Onyango &
Jentoft 2008). In fact, some fishers reported that any
community member known to use illegal gear is
shunned by other villagers.
Institutional factors affecting BMUs
The major reason for establishing BMUs was to improve
community participation in surveillance and manage-
ment, and to stop detrimental fishing practices such as
using illegal gear or destructive methods (LVFO 2007).
The present study found that BMUs have inadequate
resources for intensive monitoring, control and surveil-
lance (MCS) operations and that most BMUs are not yet
able to successfully control illegal fishing in their areas.
In spite of the efforts of many BMU committees to
improve compliance to fishing rules, most BMUs have
been unable or unwilling to undertake regular MCS
activities because of a lack of patrol equipment such as
boats and engines, high fuel costs, inadequate funds to
pay patrol teams; lack of proper security during patrols;
and corruption or bribing of fisheries officials which
undermine the legitimacy of the BMU committee leaders
authority (Lawrence 2013); and the high cost of hiring
additional security officials. While fishermen interviewed
in the present study seem to have good knowledge of
current fishing regulations concerning the minimum
mesh sizes of nets and the slot size of fish to be landed,
a majority of fishers do not adhere to or comply with
these regulations. The present study findings suggest
knowledge of the rules has little impact on fisher’s beha-
viours. Thus, there is a high degree of regulatory dis-
obedience regarding the lake. Thus, these data suggest
more resources are required for MCS operations if suc-
cessful co-management is to take place through the
BMU organizations. Monitoring, control and surveillance
must be strengthened to enforce the implemented rules,
and measures from higher political entities must be
implemented to address the corruption of fisheries offi-
cials.
The overall impression of monitoring and enforcement
in Lake Victoria fisheries is that it suffers from a combi-
nation of problems. First, convictions of offenders result
in very low fines. Second, illegal gear and immature fish
are often kept and traded by fishers, despite being out-
lawed. Third, those with the capacity to control such
unsustainable practices are discouraged and unmotivated,
resulting in their culpability in these activities (Geheb
1997; Lawrence & Watkins 2011; Lawrence 2013). A sim-
ple deterrence model by Eggert and Lokina (2008) pre-
dicted that most fishers would violate the regulations
when the risk of detection was low, fines were modest,
and the profits from violation were substantial. Inability
to enforce rules also is attributable to corruption and
clanism and/or family/kinship relations (LVFO 2008b).
Thus, BMU performance is likely to be limited among
fishing communities, as they are culpable to these fac-
tors.
For the Lake Victoria fishery, there are small groups
of persistent violators, as indicated by previous studies
on fishery compliance (Eggert & Ellergard 2003; Eggert
& Lokina 2008). Fishers have a tendency to use illegal
mesh size, and to issue bribes when caught by enforce-
ment agents, in order to evade compliance with the
regulations. These persistent violators benefit from
using illegal small mesh-sized nets over larger, legal-
sized nets. Smaller nets will catch illegal-sized fish, and
with weak MCS on Lake Victoria, offenders view
continued illegal fishing to be more beneficial (profit or
benefit of illegal fishing and being caught exceeds the
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cost for doing it) than following the rules. A Lake Vic-
toria study of Tanzanian fishers compliance produced
similar results, whereby fishers seemed to have found
that violation of fishing regulations was the most bene-
ficial strategy, irrespective of deterrence measures put
in place to prevent such practices (Eggert & Lokina
2008).
Many BMUs still perform poorly in the area of finan-
cial management. Sustainable financing of BMUs is
essential for the sustainability of the organizations and
their effective operation (Scullion 2008). The present
study indicates the revenue-raising capability of BMUs
has been modest, likely attributable to limited income-
generating powers, reduced direct support from donors
and other financial institutions to fishers, a weak tax
base, and the dependency on diminishing fish catch vol-
umes. BMU committee leaders also lack skills and legal
powers to operate savings and credit services and to col-
lect revenue. The funding problems of Kenya’s BMUs
are indicative of most donor-supported fisheries co-man-
agement engagements in Africa, which are typically man-
aged under conditions tailored to meet donor
expectations, with the community being relegated to
being recipients of donor instructions (Hara & Nielsen
2002). Nunan (2007) noted that dependence of co-man-
agement on donor-support threatens the sustainability of
the systems and structures created as part of Lake Victo-
ria co-management.
The success and operation of the BMUs depend on
the nested institutions supporting it (Cinner et al. 2009).
The Ministry of Fisheries Development, research institu-
tions, LVFO, courts and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) have defined roles at different stages of the co-
management programme that encompass initial steps,
enforcement, monitoring and making new rules. Repeated
exposure to sensitization by District Fisheries Officers
(DFOs) and Kenyan Marine Fisheries Research Institute
(KMFRI) researchers concerning fisheries management
and bad fishing methods did yield positive results,
namely a high rate of knowledge of legal fishing prac-
tices at the BMUs. These results concur with the find-
ings of Geheb et al. (2002), who showed that the beach
committee’s continuous association with the KMFRI
research team at Obenge Beach resulted in the beach
administration developing systems to patrol around their
set nets in order to prevent theft, and to ban the sale of
undersized fish from their landing site. Despite the fact
that DFOs are supposed to transfer knowledge to their
field staff and BMU officials, little training has been
effectively conducted because of financial constraints and
lack of administrative oversight. This dilemma was cap-
tured well by one respondent who said that: ‘We protect
the fisheries better than the government can. We have to,
because Government employees don’t really have any inter-
est in fisheries. It is a job for them. For us, it is life’ (per-
sonal communication, Tom Guda, Kenya BMU Network
Chairman).
CONCLUSION
This study’s findings highlight several challenges facing
implementation of fishery co-management for Lake Victo-
ria. First, the creation of BMUs has not systematically
ensured the success of co-management of Lake Victoria
fisheries. BMUs are involved in activities that have high
potential for social sustainability, but have been either
unable or unwilling to undertake their core functions
related to enforcement and compliance with fishing rules.
Second, BMUs have inadequate resources for intensive
MCS operations, being often unable to control illegal fish-
ing in their areas of jurisdiction. Third, although fishers
are well aware of the fishing rules and regulations, viola-
tion rates are high, likely due to weak MCS activities by
the BMUs. The decision of fishers to not comply with
regulations demonstrates the benefits of illegally fishing
outweigh the costs, that the risk of detection is low, that
fines are very cheap, and the profits from participation in
illegal activities are substantial.
Although co-management is used as a mechanism to
devolve power to resource users, the reality is that bal-
ance of power and authority often favours the state, as
opposed to BMUs. BMUs can currently create rules
and by-laws, but their scope is limited to designating
closed fishing seasons, creating gear restrictions or
restricting the number of fishing vessels at their landing
site, and creating no-take areas. The rules created by
BMUs, however, depend on the ability to enforce them.
In view of the weakness of MCS operations, however,
BMUs must rely on external entities, such as the Fish-
eries Department or police, for enforcement. This
dependence demonstrates the proper authority has not
yet been delegated, and that BMU committees have less
legitimacy in conducting their operations. The findings
of the present study demonstrate the degree of power
devolved is a key factor associated with the failure(s) of
co-management arrangements, leading to inadequate
community participation, inadequate sustainable funding
streams, and the inability to conduct MCS successfully.
As a result, BMUs are struggling to fulfil their desig-
nated roles in fisheries management and community
development.
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Recommendations
The following recommendations arise from the present
study:
1 Improved Governance Measures: The government
and BMU networks must conduct regular, efficient MCS
operations. All MCS activities should be carried out in
partnership between the designated, formal government
entities, and with each BMU committee leadership, in
order to ensure legitimacy is preserved at the community
level. Priority should be given to enforcing existing legis-
lation on gear restrictions, including the ban on beach
seining and use of small mesh-sized nets (<5”). Increased
collaborative MCS activities should lead to increased
compliance with fishery regulations;
2 Sustainable Funding Mechanisms: A major chal-
lenge facing BMUs is reliance on donor funding for their
operations. Becoming legitimate and sustainable fishery
management organizations requires that BMUs become
financially independent. Reducing the need for donor
funding might be accomplished through partnerships
with established financial institutions that provide educa-
tion and training in financial management. BMU financial
independence, however, relies on numerous variables,
including the BMU committee’s ability to collect taxes
and fines with little or no interruption from higher levels
of authority. It is urged, therefore, that attention be
focused on BMUs financial independence through proper
trainings and oversight. Facilitating such independence
might be best conducted through programmes by the
LVFO and KMFRI;
3 Continuous Collaboration: The Lake Victoria
co-management programme relies on the need for contin-
uous collaboration between BMUs and other fishery-ori-
ented organizations, including the LVFO, fisheries
research institutes (e.g. KMFRI), the Ministry and the
departments of fisheries, and other organizations. Contin-
uous collaboration facilitates the flow of consistently
changing information, including changes to the biophysi-
cal (catches and perceived fish populations), institutional
(regulations changes), economic (value of fish), socio-po-
litical (community response and awareness to regulations
or enforcement), demographic (number of fishers,
boats), and infrastructural (access to markets) character-
istics of Lake Victoria. Information flowing between those
engaged in the fishery is necessary for successful Lake
Victoria co-management activities. Information and com-
munications must be facilitated through appropriate
mechanisms, and should include meetings, public aware-
ness campaigns and educational programmes.
4 Further Research on Fishing Communities: Lake
Victoria is an important resource for millions of people.
Understanding how successful management can be
accomplished will take time and much more data.
Accordingly, continued and enhanced studies of this
resource, and the communities charged with managing it,
is urged. The present study, for example, was limited in
scope and would have benefited from the input of other
fishery stakeholders such as boat crews, traders, arti-
sanal processors, factory agents and other members who
engage in fisheries and interact with BMUs.
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